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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: From an agency perspective, we investigate whether family 
ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm’s choice of 
auditor. Our analysis focuses on three different characteristics of family ownership and control: 
family ownership (cash flow rights), disparity between cash flow and voting rights held by 
family owners (cash–vote divergence), and the family identities of CEOs. 
Research Findings/Insights: Our findings suggest that different family ownership and control 
configurations lead to different agency effects. The alignment effect prevails in family firms with 
greater family ownership, founder CEOs, and professional CEOs, whereas the entrenchment 
effect prevails when there is greater cash–vote divergence. Despite the presence of two distinct 
types of agency effects, regardless of differences in family ownership and control configurations, 
none of these firms are inclined to appoint higher-quality auditors. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study advances our understanding of the varied 
agency effects arising from family ownership, cash–vote divergence, and the family identities of 
CEOs, as well as the impact of family ownership and control features on auditor choice. Our 
empirical evidence provides a unique insight, showing that higher-quality auditors do not tend to 
be appointed in firms where family alignment with outside investors is relatively strong, as this 
lowers demand for such auditors. In addition, although family entrenchment may create greater 
outside investor demand for higher-quality auditors, such demand is difficult to realize. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Auditors are an important external governance mechanism. 
This study offers insights for policy makers, family owners, auditors, and other capital market 
participants, with regard to the varied effects of different family ownership and control features 
on auditor choice. 
Key words: Corporate Governance, Family Firm Governance, Auditor Choice, Ownership 
Structure, CEO Family Identity 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Family firms are a distinct type of organizational structure. Unlike non-family firms, they are 
often characterized by concentrated family ownership and greater involvement by family 
members in the management. However, it should be noted that family firms are not a 
homogenous group. Differences in family ownership and control features create varied 
incentives for family owners and consequently influence the agency environment within the firm 
(e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chen, Cheng, & Dai, 2013; Wang, 2006). This in turn may 
influence auditor choice, which is an important company decision relating to financial reporting. 
It has been suggested that monitoring by higher-quality auditors can reduce insiders’ incentives 
and ability to render financial statements less informative, thereby alleviating the problem of 
agency conflict between insiders and outsiders by mitigating information asymmetry (e.g., 
Becker, Defond, & Jiambalvo, 1998). However, to date, few studies have examined auditing 
issues in family firms (Ho & Kang, 2013; Trotman, & Trotman, 2010). This study adds to the 
existing literature by investigating whether family ownership and control configurations are 
systematically associated with a firm’s choice of auditor. Our analysis focuses on three different 
features of family ownership and control: founding family ownership (cash flow rights), 
disparity between cash flow and voting rights held by family owners (cash–vote divergence), and 
the family identities of CEOs. 
From an agency perspective, appointing higher-quality auditors may be a double-edged sword 
when aimed at controlling family owners. A family firm’s propensity to hire a higher-quality 
auditor will depend on how family owners view the importance of credible financial reporting in 
relation to their own interests. The presence of a founding family significantly influences agency 
conflicts within a firm in two opposing ways, referred to in the literature as the alignment effect 
and the entrenchment effect. The alignment effect predicts that when there are stronger economic 
and/or emotional bonds between family owners and their firms, the controlling family owners 
may introduce monitoring mechanisms that restrict managers’ ability to expropriate firms’ 
resources at the expense of shareholders. In this way, the controlling owners can enhance or 
preserve long-term monetary and non-monetary gain for the founding family, and in the process, 
mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Type I agency problem) (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). If such an alignment effect prevails, the controlling family owners are more 
willing to hire higher-quality auditors for better monitoring. On the other hand, the entrenchment 
effect prevails when family owners are empowered by their concentrated ownership. Tight 
family control as a result of the concentrated shareholdings may allow opportunistic family 
owners greater power and opportunity to divert corporate resources for personal use. This can 
lead to severe conflicts of interest between the controlling (family) shareholders and other 
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shareholders (Type II agency problem). To ensure that their private interests can be realized, the 
controlling owners may be reluctant to hire higher-quality auditors, as such auditors would 
conduct strict monitoring. 
The alignment or entrenchment effect arising from the different family ownership and control 
configurations is reflected in a family firm’s financial reporting practices (Ali, Chen, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007; Wang, 2006), which will influence outside investors’ perceptions 
regarding the importance of higher-quality auditors to their own interests. When outside 
investors perceive their interests to be closely aligned with the controlling family owners (i.e., 
less severe Type I agency problem), demand for higher-quality auditors is lower because the 
monitoring benefits of hiring these auditors become less important. In contrast, when outside 
investors perceive that the family owners are entrenched (i.e., more severe Type II agency 
problem), demand for credible accounting information for management oversight will be greater, 
and thus demand for higher-quality auditors will also be greater.  
Both family owners and outside investors operationally have a voice in relation to auditing 
matters (Dao, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2012; Trotman & Trotman, 2010). We argue that a family 
firm’s auditor choice is a consequence of a tradeoff between the family owners’ intrinsic 
alignment or entrenchment incentive for supplying credible accounting information, and the 
outside investors’ corresponding demand for such information. Therefore, in this study we test 
the net effect of this tradeoff in different family ownership and control scenarios. 
Taiwan is an ideal setting in which to study auditor choice in family firms, because of the 
predominance of family-controlled firms with highly concentrated family member ownership 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011). Family owners often possess 
excessive control rights beyond cash flow rights (Yeh, 2005) and dominate the top executive 
positions in the firms (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). In addition, Taiwan is also 
characterized by weaker protection for shareholders and inferior corporate governance 
mechanisms (Chen, Gray, & Nowland, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).1 In such an environment, with weaker shareholder protection 
mechanisms, the natural effects of family ownership and control configurations are more easily 
observable. 
Two legal features underpin the governance role of auditors in Taiwan. One is that audit firms 
are required to operate within unlimited liability partnerships or proprietorships (Chen, Lin, & 
Lin, 2008).2 The other is that governmental regulations require that the audit reports for public 
companies be certified by two audit partners from the same audit firm, and that these partners’ 
names be disclosed in the audit reports (Chen, Lin, & Zhou, 2005; Chi & Chin, 2011). These 
requirements mean that auditors face higher legal and reputational liability in Taiwan, which 
strengthens the incentive to fulfill their professional duties. The importance of the monitoring 
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function played by auditors is also heightened by the absence of other effective governance 
mechanisms for investor protection in Taiwan. 
This study uses the Big N auditors3 as a proxy for auditor quality. Research to date reveals 
that the Big N auditors provide better audit quality than non-Big N auditors because of their scale, 
technical expertise, and reputational incentives to identify and expose accounting irregularities 
(e.g., Barton, 2005; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Francis, 2004). Our findings 
suggest that different family ownership and control configurations lead to different agency 
effects in the firms. The alignment effect prevails in family firms with greater family ownership, 
founder CEOs, and professional CEOs, whereas the entrenchment effect prevails when there is 
greater cash–vote divergence. Despite the occurrence of two distinct types of agency effects in 
firms with different family ownership and control configurations, all the firms have a 
disinclination to appoint Big N auditors. The implication of such a unanimous outcome relating 
to auditor choice is that when family alignment prevails, firms are less likely to appoint higher-
quality auditors because of lower demand by outside investors for such auditors. Although 
family entrenchment may create greater outside investor demand for higher-quality auditors, 
such demand is difficult to realize. Neither the alignment nor entrenchment effect is apparent in 
family firms with descendant CEOs; moreover, the presence of a descendant CEO is not 
significantly associated with auditor choice. 
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, as noted above, we 
systematically examine the impact of family ownership and control on auditor choice decisions. 
Second, this study advances our understanding of the various agency costs and benefits arising 
from family ownership, cash–vote divergence, and family identities of CEOs, and also the effects 
of these family ownership and control features on auditor choice. Third, we address the opposing 
perceptions of family owners and outside investors regarding the need for credible financial 
reporting as a means of furthering their own interests in different agency environments (Wang, 
2006). Existing research has provided no clear conclusions regarding the net effect of these 
opposing perceptions on family firms’ financial reporting decisions. Our empirical evidence 
provides a unique insight, showing that family firms are more likely to echo the demand of 
outside investors for high-quality auditing when the alignment effect arising from family 
ownership and control is present, whereas firms are more likely to cater to the desires of family 
owners when the entrenchment effect is present. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the extant 
literature and develop our hypotheses. The sample selection procedure and research design are 
described in the third section. The results are then presented and discussed, and in the final 
section we draw some conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Family Firms and Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
Family firms are prevalent in Taiwan. Around 60% of listed firms in the country are family 
controlled (Claessens et al., 2000; Yeh, 2005), compared with about 40% and 48% among 
Fortune 500 firms and the largest 2,000 industrial firms, respectively, in the United States (e.g., 
Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Ownership of Taiwanese family 
firms is highly concentrated in the controlling families (Claessens et al., 2002; Fan & Wong, 
2002). In contrast to family firms in the United States, where ownership diffuses quickly after 
the firms are publicly listed, ownership in Taiwanese family firms remains closely held by 
family owners long after the firms go public (Fan et al., 2011). Furthermore, the disparity 
between cash flow rights (ownership) and voting rights (cash–vote divergence) is very common 
in Taiwanese family firms (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005), because family owners often make extensive 
use of cross-holding and pyramidal ownership structures to enhance their control beyond their 
ownership stake (Yeh, 2005). On average, the control rights of family owners exceed their cash 
flow rights by around 25% (Claessens et al., 2000). This dominance of ownership and/or control 
rights also enables family owners to secure top executive positions and thus maintain influence 
over management decisions (Claessens et al., 2002; Fan & Wong, 2002). Prior literature has 
documented that more than 50% of CEO positions in Taiwanese family firms are held by the 
controlling families (E. Chen et al., 2013). 
However, although family owners are predominant in the Taiwanese capital market, investor 
protection and corporate governance mechanisms are relatively weak (E. Chen et al., 2013; 
Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). Internally, controlling shareholders, such as family 
owners, possess dominant influence over the appointment of board members in a firm, and board 
independence is generally low (E. Chen et al., 2013; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). On average, 
51.54% of board members are family directors (E. Chen et al., 2013). Externally, 70% of shares 
on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange are traded by individual investors (Sue, Chin, & Chan, 2013). 
Ownership held by institutional investors is relatively low, which may reduce investor incentive 
and effectiveness of management oversight (Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke, 2001). In addition, there is a 
lack of external markets for corporate control in Taiwan with mergers and acquisition activities 
being rare (Claessens et al., 2002). The controlling shareholders therefore face a lower risk of 
losing control as a consequence of takeovers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
In addition to the specific structural characteristics of Taiwan’s capital market, Taiwanese 
firms are affected by the strong traditional Chinese culture, which places an emphasis on family 
values (E. Chen et al., 2013). Collectivism, rather than individualism, is the focus in this cultural 
context (Zapalska & Edwards, 2001). Tsai, Hung, Kuo, and Kuo (2006) argue that the 
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managerial philosophy in Taiwanese family firms is based on trust, which is rooted in the culture 
of collectivism. In contrast to professional managers in non-family firms in Taiwan, controlling 
family owners are more concerned about the reputation of the firm, because such firms are 
typically viewed as an integral extension of their own families (Zapalska & Edwards, 2001). This 
gives family owners the incentive to place greater value on the social legitimacy of the family 
firm for their own sake, and to place more emphasis on the protection of long-term family wealth. 
Although family ownership in Taiwan may be dominant, the psychological commitment to the 
family firm may motivate family owners to pursue organizational interests and reduce their 
incentive to be individually opportunistic at the expense of other shareholders. 
Auditing is an important external governance mechanism. Audit firms are responsible for 
monitoring the quality of financial reporting, and consequently mitigate the problem of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors by enhancing transparency. As 
noted above, the legal requirements for dual auditor signatures and the organizational structure of 
unlimited liability partnerships or proprietorships heightens auditors’ legal and reputational 
liability in Taiwan, and thus motivates them to fulfill their auditing duties more effectively. The 
importance of auditing is especially prominent in the Taiwanese capital market, in which the 
other governance mechanisms are relatively weak (Chen et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2005). 
Collectively, Taiwanese family firms share unique characteristics in contrast to their non-
family counterparts. These characteristics may affect the nature and extent of the agency 
problems that occur in family firms, thus influencing the selection of external auditors. 
 
Theoretical Framework for Family Firms and Auditor Choice 
The appointment of auditors is an important financial reporting decision for a firm. The choice of 
auditor is a manifestation of a firm’s financial reporting quality, which is a significant factor in 
reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outside shareholders, and also enhances 
management monitoring (Barton, 2005; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Guedhami, 
Pittman, & Saffar, 2014). Prior studies have suggested that the Big N auditors provide better 
oversight of financial reporting quality than their non-Big N counterparts. Large audit firms 
typically have better resources and superior expertise to ensure the provision of high-quality 
auditing (e.g., Fan & Wong, 2005; Francis, 2004). However, large auditors face greater litigation 
risk (e.g., Choi & Wong, 2007; Kuhurana & Raman, 2004). In addition, they are more concerned 
about their reputation (e.g., Barton, 2005; Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 2004). The Big N auditors’ 
worldwide service networks typically provide uniformly high-quality audit services, in order to 
avoid damage to their international reputation (e.g., Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009). In 
particular, in countries with weaker shareholder protection, the Big N auditors are even more 
sensitive regarding their reputation, because it is more difficult for investors to recover from 
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losses incurred as a consequence of audit failure (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Guedhami et al., 2014). 
Family firms represent a unique organizational structure. There are two competing agency 
perspectives explaining the behavior of family owners. First, the alignment effect predicts that 
the interests of managers and shareholders are better aligned in family firms than in non-family 
firms, because family owners hold a large block of shares and will consequently be more 
strongly motivated to monitor managers. In addition, controlling family owners usually enjoy the 
sense of family identity attached to the firm, which gives them an incentive to maintain the long-
term presence of their families in the firms. Such owners are concerned with the perpetuation of 
non-economic utilities gained from their family firms (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007); they therefore have a stronger desire to preserve the family 
reputation in order to ensure the sustainability of the family dynasty (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & 
Lester, 2013). Because family owners have both economic and non-economic ties to their firms, 
they are willing to introduce effective monitoring mechanisms to oversee the firm in good faith. 
Consequently, according to the alignment effect, the controlling family owners are motivated to 
monitor management intensively, and/or avoid value-destroying accounting practices, through 
hiring higher-quality auditors, as this will protect their interests in the firm. 
In contrast, the entrenchment effect predicts that conflicts of interest between controlling 
family owners and other shareholders will be high in family firms, because the more 
concentrated ownership and domination of top executive positions creates an incentive for family 
owners to expropriate firm assets for their private benefit (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 1999; Shlefer & Vishny, 1997). From this perspective, controlling family 
owners would act to discourage information flow related to firm activities, in order to conceal 
their own opportunistic behaviors. Consequently, the controlling family owners may be reluctant 
to appoint higher-quality auditors, because stricter monitoring imposed by the auditors will 
reduce their discretion in fostering opacity regarding transactions that benefit themselves. 
Although the above arguments suggest that the intrinsic agency incentives of controlling 
family owners have an impact on their preference for employing higher-quality auditors, external 
demand for audit quality may also be a driving force behind a firm’s auditor choice (Fan & 
Wong, 2005). Prior studies argue that external demand for high-quality auditors is dependent on 
the degree of conflict of interest between insiders and outside investors (e.g., Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). When the alignment effect is present, controlling family 
owners, acting as committed monitors, can provide control and oversight as a substitute for the 
disciplinary role of transparent accounting information. The presence of such aligned family 
owners may mitigate the need for higher-quality auditors because the perceived monitoring 
benefit from those auditors is relatively modest. In contrast, when controlling family owners are 
perceived to be entrenched, the potential agency conflicts between these owners and minority 
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shareholders will amplify external demand for higher-quality auditors; this is because such 
auditors are more likely to provide credible audit services, thus ensuring that better-quality 
accounting information is available for management oversight. 
The prevalence of the alignment effect or the entrenchment effect in family firms may depend 
on the features of family ownership and control (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Variations in these 
features may consequently affect a family firm’s auditor choice. We therefore address this issue 
by analyzing how differences in family ownership, disparity between family cash flow and 
voting rights, and family identity of CEO, affect auditor choice. 
 
Family Ownership Configurations and Auditor Choice 
Family ownership reflects the closeness between a family and the associated firm(s). The extent 
of shareholdings held by the family owners usually reflects both the financial and affective 
aspects of these owners’ ownership in the firms. As noted previously, on the one hand, 
concentrated family ownership may give owners the incentive to exercise effective monitoring to 
protect their wealth that is embedded in the family firm(s). The alignment of interests between 
family owners and other shareholders is therefore argued to be higher in the presence of greater 
family ownership. Prior studies have investigated the agency effect of family ownership by 
testing its relationship with firm performance (e.g., Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Findings show that firms with greater family ownership are more likely to have a higher Tobin’s 
Q, suggesting the alignment effect of family ownership. In addition, prior literature further 
argues that information asymmetry is likely to be lower in family firms with greater family 
ownership, because more highly concentrated shareholdings may motivate these owners to 
supply better-quality financial reporting in order to enhance monitoring (Wang, 2006). 
On the other hand, greater family shareholdings may enable family members to be more 
dominant in the firm (Fan & Wong, 2002). More highly concentrated family ownership would 
give family owners the incentive and power to divert wealth from the other shareholders to 
themselves, and thus heighten Type II agency problems (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Shlefer & Vishny, 1997). To serve their private interests, controlling shareholders with greater 
shareholdings may tend to withhold internal information and avoid reporting high-quality 
accounting information, because greater transparency may place them under more rigorous 
scrutiny in the capital market (Fan & Wong, 2002; Wang, 2006). 
Although the existing theoretical perspectives offer divergent predictions regarding the effects 
of family ownership, the alignment effect of such ownership structures is argued to be the factor 
that will prevail in markets with weaker investor protections, such as Taiwan (La Porta et al., 
1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Shlefer & Vishny, 1997; Yeh & 
Woidtke, 2005). In particular, as discussed earlier, family owners in Taiwan traditionally 
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emphasize long-term family values (E. Chen et al., 2013). Higher levels of family ownership 
often foster a sense of collectivism and stewardship, thus resulting in stronger alignment between 
family owners and other shareholders (Tsai et al., 2006; Zapalska & Edwards, 2001). The 
resulting positive alignment incentive of greater family ownership may mitigate the need for 
outside investors to rely on credible accounting information for monitoring, and thus lower their 
demand for higher-quality auditors. Since there are higher costs associated with appointing 
higher-quality auditors (e.g., Francis, 1984), family firms with more concentrated family 
ownership would have a lower incentive to hire such auditors. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The appointment of Big N auditors is negatively associated with family ownership. 
 
The divergence between cash flow and voting rights held by family owners may induce 
agency conflicts between controlling and other shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002). Family 
owners often use cross-shareholding and pyramidal ownership structures to leverage their control 
over the firm (Fan & Wong, 2002; Yeh, 2005). The resulting excessive control rights over cash 
flow (ownership) rights result in the financial interests of controlling family owners becoming 
detached from direct ownership. This gives the family owners greater ability and a stronger 
incentive to extract rents from the firms that they dominate. Such owners are more likely to earn 
more from enhancing private interests than they would lose from damage to the firm’s wealth 
(Morck et al., 1988; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
In addition, the increased complexity of ownership configurations as a result of cross-
shareholding and pyramidal share structures typically makes it difficult for minority shareholders 
to detect and understand the relationship between ownership and control (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). 
Under these ownership arrangements, the association between the family owners and the firm 
appears to be relatively remote, and thus the identity and reputation of the family are less likely 
to be closely entangled with the firm. Consequently, family owners with a greater degree of 
voting rights relative to ownership are likely to be more entrenched, which leads to more severe 
Type II agency problems (Fan & Wong, 2002). Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that family 
firms with a higher divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights held by family 
members are inclined to have a lower Tobin’s Q. This empirical finding suggests that a larger 
disparity between these two rights leads to greater family entrenchment. 
Prior studies reveal that increasing information transparency may bring the controlling 
family owners under closer scrutiny and threaten their power to control. Hence, controlling 
family owners who have excessive control rights may tend to avoid informed challenges posed 
by outside investors; they can do so by providing lower-quality accounting information, in order 
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to preserve their control benefits (Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, & Imperatore, 2014). Yeh and Woidtke 
(2005) argue that controlling owners in Taiwan will tend to wield their influence to accrue 
private benefits when the entrenchment effect of excessive control outweighs the positive 
incentive effect of cash flow ownership. Evidence from Taiwan also suggests that family firms 
with greater enhanced family control rights are more likely to provide lower-quality financial 
reporting (Fan & Wong, 2002; Sue et al., 2013). Moreover, holding excessive control rights 
beyond cash flow rights provides controlling family owners with additional means to further 
magnify their influence relative to outside investors (Anderson et al., 2009). Thus, the outside 
investors would have greater demand for higher-quality auditors, in order to prevent potential 
wealth expropriation as a result of the disparity between cash flow rights and voting rights held 
by family members; however, the weak shareholder protection environment of Taiwan’s capital 
market makes it difficult for them to go against the dominant family owners and realize such 
demands. We therefore argue that family firms with greater cash–vote divergence are more likely 
to hire lower-quality auditors. Consequently, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The appointment of Big N auditors is negatively associated with divergence 
between cash flow and voting rights held by family owners. 
 
Family CEOs and Auditor Choice 
Auditor choice may be influenced in different ways, depending on who runs the family firm (X. 
Chen et al., 2013). Founder, descendant and professional CEOs have different senses of identity 
within family firms. Prior findings suggest that the sense of family identity affects managerial 
incentives and leads to differences in behavior in terms of decision making (e.g., Chang & Shim, 
2015; Lin & Hu, 2007; Mullins & Schoar, 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
For example, founders have a unique psychological attachment to the firms they found. They 
were responsible for establishing the firm(s) and are usually representative of the 
entrepreneurship brand (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Founders 
hold long-term investment horizons and a stronger intention to pass the business on to their 
descendants (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). They possess a sense of responsibility for perpetuating 
the family affiliation with the firm, and take particular care in developing a positive family 
reputation in order to ensure the sustainability of the family wealth and firm identity (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). Founders who assume the CEO position in the family firms have a greater 
propensity to behave as a good steward and monitor decisions more intensively for other 
stakeholders (Chen, Liu, Yang, & Chen, 2016; Mullins & Schoar, 2016; Tsai et al., 2006). 
Conflicts of interest between controlling and other shareholders are thus lower in firms led by 
founders, as founders are motivated to place the long-term interests of the firm ahead of their 
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individual private interests (Amit et al., 1990). Such an alignment effect for founder CEOs is 
evident in the greater corporate value measured by Tobin’s Q (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Prior studies further argue that the positive alignment incentive motivates founder CEOs to 
provide better, more informative accounting information (Wang, 2006). This is beneficial for 
enhancing information transparency between insiders and outside investors. Therefore, the 
benefits associated with appointing higher-quality auditors for the monitoring of firms managed 
by founder CEOs would be relatively marginal, because the outside investors’ reliance on these 
auditors for wealth protection would be lower. Given the higher costs associated with employing 
higher-quality auditors (e.g., Francis, 1984), family firms with founder CEOs may be less likely 
to appoint such auditors. Consequently, we hypothesize that: 
  
Hypothesis 3.1. The appointment of Big N auditors is negatively associated with the presence of 
founder CEOs. 
 
As family firms evolve, the CEO positions are likely to be passed from the founders to either 
family descendants or professional managers. Concentration of family ownership is likely to 
become more dispersed after founders pass the firm(s) on to later generations (Mullins & Schoar, 
2016). Unlike founders, it is difficult for descendants to share controlling power with other 
family members based on a shared vision, because each branch of the family tends to emphasize 
the best interests of its own nuclear household (e.g., Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2007; 
Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010). Such conflicts of interest in subsequent generations 
increase the reliance on formal bureaucratic control in managing the firm’s operations. In other 
words, the psychological tie between family and firm becomes more distant (Ensley & Pearson, 
2005; Mullins & Schoar, 2016). Therefore, descendant CEOs are more likely to be interested in 
greater entrenchment and maximizing their private interests at the expense of other shareholders 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Villalonga and Amit (2006) report a negative association between 
the presence of descendant CEOs and Tobin’s Q, suggesting the entrenchment effect of these 
CEOs. Because greater opaqueness can help descendant CEOs accrue private benefits from 
control, this may give them a stronger incentive to exploit their power, for example by 
appointing lower-quality auditors in order to avoid strict scrutiny of accounting reporting quality. 
Although outside investors in family firms managed by such CEOs would demand higher-quality 
auditors in order to ensure the availability of credible accounting information for effective 
monitoring, it would be difficult for them to realize such demands in a market with weak 
investor protection, such as Taiwan’s. Consequently, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2. The appointment of Big N auditors is negatively associated with the presence of 
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descendant CEOs. 
 
Professional CEOs can also be selected to fill CEO positions in family firms. Similar to CEOs 
in non-family firms, the presence of a professional CEO is more likely to induce the classic 
manager–shareholder conflict in family firms, because of the separation of ownership from 
control and a lower degree of non-pecuniary ties between manager and firm. However, 
professional CEOs of family firms possess fewer explicit or implicit control rights than other 
types of CEOs (Mullins & Schoar, 2016). Thus, their decisions will be subject to monitoring by 
the controlling family owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Additionally, the founding family may 
emphasize nurturing the stewardship of professional managers in order to reduce the managers’ 
short-term opportunistic behaviors and ensure that family interests are protected (Chen et al., 
2016). Barontini and Caprio (2006) provide evidence that firms managed by professional 
managers have a higher Tobin’s Q when they are subject to monitoring by family owners. Wang 
(2006) reports that financial reporting quality in family firms led by professional CEOs is higher, 
suggesting that monitoring by the controlling family owners may mitigate the owner–manager 
agency problem in this context. We therefore argue that the lower agency conflict and greater 
reporting quality in such firms, which results from the monitoring effect of family owners, may 
reduce the demand for higher-quality auditors by other investors. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.3. The appointment of Big N auditors is negatively associated with the presence of 
professional CEOs of family firms. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLIGY 
Sample 
The data used in the empirical testing are based on a sample of firms publicly listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1996 and 2015. Firms in the financial and utility sectors are not 
included in our sample on the grounds that they have a number of significant differences in terms 
of industrial characteristics and accounting systems. Data were also collected in relation to 
family cash flow, voting rights, auditors, and financial information, from the Taiwan Economic 
Journal (TEJ) database. Information about the CEO, board structure, and block shareholders was 
also obtained from each company’s prospectus. Family member relationships within the firm 
were identified based on information provided in Business Groups in Taiwan.4 Observations 
without complete financial and corporate governance information were omitted. The final sample 
consists of 16,225 firm-years observations. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample firms 
for each year from 1996 to 2015 (Panel A), and the distribution of the industrial classification of 
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the observations (Panel B). Family firms in Taiwan accounted for 64.17% of total observations. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Dependent Variables 
Following the strategy employed in prior studies (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy, 
Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998), firm performance in relation to various types of family 
ownership and control configurations was assessed in order to generate results reflecting the 
relative importance of the alignment and entrenchment effects associated with family firms and 
with each type of family ownership and control feature. In the relevant regressions, Tobin’s Q 
(Tobin’s Q) is used as the dependent variable to measure firm performance (e.g., Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Dow & McGuire, 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Tobin’s Q is the sum of the 
market value of common stock, the book value of preferred stock, and the book value of long-
term debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
In the auditor choice model, auditor quality (AUDITOR) is the dependent variable, gauged as 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one for firms with Big N auditors, and zero otherwise 
(e.g., Barton, 2005; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Francis, 2004).5 
 
Independent Variables 
The presence of family firms (FAM) compared to non-family firms is used to test the effect of 
family firms on auditor choice. FAM is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the 
firm is classified as a family firm, and zero otherwise. Following prior studies (Anderson, Duru, 
& Reeb, 2012; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Reeb, & Zhao, 2012; X. Chen et al., 2013), 
we define a company as a family firm if (1) the founders or their descendants continue to hold 
positions in top management or on the board, or (2) their family members collectively hold more 
than 5% of shares in the firm. Family ownership (FOWN) and cash–vote divergence (FDIV) are 
two measures of the family ownership configuration: FOWN is the percentage of common shares 
(cash flow rights) held by the family members, and FDIV is measured as the difference between 
the percentage of voting rights (FVR) and cash flow rights (FOWN) held by the family members 
(Shyu & Lee, 2009).6 The CEO’s position in a family firm is identified according to whether that 
individual is a founder, descendant or professional manager. FF_CEO is a dummy variable with 
a value of one if the position of CEO is held by the family founder, and zero otherwise. FD_CEO 
is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the position of CEO is held by a 
descendant, and zero otherwise. FH_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the family firm 
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has a professional CEO, and zero otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables are drawn from the literature. First, the natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE) is used to control for firm size. Firm size is associated with a firm’s ability to access 
financing and economies of scale, which has beneficial effects on firm performance. In addition, 
given the complexity of their operations, as suggested in past studies, larger firms typically hire 
higher-quality auditors (e.g., Fan & Wong, 2005; Guedhami et al., 2014). Firm age (AGE) is 
considered. Older firms are normally less innovative, and thus are likely to have lower earnings 
prospects. However, they also have greater accumulated business reputation, and consequently 
are motivated to preserve such reputations through appointing higher-quality auditors (Lee, 
Stokes, Taylor, & Walter, 2003). We also control for leverage (LEV), which is measured by the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Firms with higher leverage are more likely to have greater 
agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders and face higher firm risk. These firms are 
therefore more likely to perform poorly and to have greater demand for higher-quality auditors 
(Fan & Wong, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The ratio of capital expenditures to total property, plants, and equipment (CAPITAL), and the 
ratio of research and development expenses to total sales (R&D), are used as indicators for 
investment policies. Past studies suggest that a firm’s performance is associated with its capital 
expenditure and R&D activities (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Prior studies have also 
indicated that the growth of a firm is associated with its performance (Chen, Hou, Li, Wilson, & 
Wu, 2014). Thus, we use the percentage change in sales over the last three years (GROWTH) to 
capture firm growth. The standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 36 months 
(FIRM_RISK) is used to control for the firm’s level of financial risk in the capital market. Such 
risk is considered a threat to firm performance (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003). It is suggested 
that loss and profitability may affect the firm’s demand for higher-quality auditors (e.g., Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Ho & Kang, 2013). Loss (LOSS) is used to control for the potential distress risk of 
a firm: it is measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has reported a net loss 
in the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise. We control for profitability, measured as the ratio 
of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (ROA). 
Finally, we also control for various corporate governance characteristics, including board size 
(BOARD_SIZE), board independence (IND_BOARD), the presence of an audit committee 
(AUDIT_COMMIT), CEO duality (DUALITY), and total external block ownership 
(BLOCK_OWN). It has been suggested that these corporate governance characteristics are 
associated with the effectiveness of monitoring functions and the financial reporting quality of a 
firm, and consequently have an impact on the firm’s demand for high-quality auditors (e.g., 
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Beasley & Petroni, 2001; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, 
& Xu, 2011; Ho & Kang, 2013; Klein, 2002; Minichilli, Brogi, & Calabrò, 2016). 
 
Regression Models and Specifications 
Two regression models are employed in this study. First, in Model (1), we model a Tobin’s Q 
with family ownership, cash–vote divergence, and the family identities of CEOs, in order to 
identify the associated alignment or entrenchment effects of these family ownership and control 
features (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy et al., 1998). Then, we test our hypotheses 
related to auditor choice by using logistic analysis in Model (2). 
 
Tobin’s Qi,t = f (Familyi,t, Controli,t) + εi,t ,                                               (1) 
AUDITORi,t = f (Familyi,t, Controli,t) + εi,t,                                                (2) 
 
where the dependent variables used in Model (1) and Model (2) are Tobin’s Q and AUDITOR, 
respectively. Family indicates family ownership and control features, consisting of FAM, FOWN, 
FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, and FH_CEO, for firm i at time t. Control represents a set of control 
variables for the models. The control variables in Model (1) comprise SIZE, AGE, LEV, 
CAPITAL, R&D, GROWTH, FIRM_RISK, BOARD_SIZE, IND_BOARD, AUDIT_COMMIT, 
DUALITY, and BLOCK_OWN. The control variables in Model (2) are SIZE, AGE, LEV, LOSS, 
ROA, BOARD_SIZE, IND_BOARD, AUDIT_COMMIT, DUALITY, and BLOCK_OWN. All the 
variables employed in the models are as defined above. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables. To avoid the influence of extreme values, 
all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distribution. Panel A 
shows the characteristics of family ownership, control, and management within family firms. 
The mean value for the common shares (i.e., cash flow rights) held by founding family members 
(FOWN) is 34%, which is significantly higher than the 13% reported by Ho and Kang (2013) for 
ownership in the United States. The results further demonstrate that the mean value for the 
voting rights held by the family owners (FVR) is 42%, which is also significantly higher than the 
18% documented in the United States by Ali et al. (2007). There are 44% of family firms with 
cash–vote divergence in Taiwan. The mean value for the difference between the voting and cash 
flow rights held by family owners (FDIV) is 8%, suggesting that in Taiwanese family firms, the 
voting rights of the family owners are apparently greater than their cash flow rights. Overall, 
ownership does appear to be concentrated among family owners, rather than widely held or 
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controlled. 
In addition, family members often hold the most important executive position in the firms. 
For instance, 23% and 31% of family firms in the sample had a founder CEO (FF_CEO) or a 
descendent CEO (FD_CEO), respectively, while 46% hired a professional CEO (FH_CEO). 
Overall, a total of 54% of the family firms nominated a family CEO, which is higher than the 
33% found in the United States, as reported by Ho and Kang (2013). Collectively, these statistics 
suggest that family owners play a very dominant role in Taiwanese family firms. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the financial and corporate governance 
variables for all samples. These variables are further categorized for family and non-family firms, 
as presented in Panel C of Table 2. It is documented that the Tobin’s Q of the family firms is 
significantly higher than that of the non-family firms (p < 0.01). In addition, 80.3% of listed 
firms in Taiwan hired Big N auditors (AUDITOR), which is less than the 95.2% reported in the 
United States by Ho and Kang (2013). However, family firms in Taiwan appointed these auditors 
to a lesser degree than non-family firms (p < 0.01); this finding is consistent with that in the 
United States, as documented by Ho and Kang (2013). 
With regard to the control variables, family firms in Taiwan, compared with non-family firms, 
are bigger in size (SIZE) and older (AGE) (p < 0.01; p < 0.01). Moreover, in relation to their non-
family counterparts, family firms are less likely to experience a loss (LOSS) (p < 0.1) and more 
likely to demonstrate better accounting performance (ROA) (p < 0.05). Both leverage ratio (LEV) 
and risk (FIRM_RISK) are lower in the family firms than in the non-family firms (p < 0.05; p < 
0.05). Additionally, family firms in Taiwan have higher growth opportunities (GROWTH) than 
non-family firms (p < 0.05). 
In terms of corporate governance characteristics, it is documented that family firms in Taiwan 
have a larger board size (BOARD_SIZE) than non-family firms (p < 0.01). Only 14.2% of board 
members are non-executive directors in Taiwanese listed firms (IND_BOARD) (Table 2: Panel 
B), which is much lower than the 55.1% reported in the United States (Ho & Kang, 2013). 
However, there is no significant difference in IND_BOARD between family and non-family 
firms. Only 7.7% of listed firms in Taiwan have an audit committee (AUDIT_COMMIT), but 
family firms are more likely to set up such committees than the non-family firms (p < 0.05). On 
average, only 31.9% of firms have CEO duality (DUALITY), which is smaller than the 55.1% 
that is characteristic of the United States (Ho & Kang, 2013). However, CEO duality is more 
common in family firms (p < 0.01). The average external block shareholdings (BLOCK_OWN) is 
35.8% in Taiwan. On average, external block investors hold more shares in family firms than in 
non-family firms (p < 0.01). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Because multicollinearity is considered problematic in regression analysis, the Pearson 
correlations between the variables are provided in Table 3, and the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) are computed for each independent variable, in order to examine whether 
multicollinearity is present. Multicollinearity in regression analysis is regarded as harmful only 
when correlations exceed 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Here, the correlations between the 
independent variables included in the regression analysis are all less than 0.232. In addition, the 
VIFs for all independent variables employed in the regressions shown in Tables 4 and 5 are far 
lower than the critical value of 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), suggesting that multicollinearity 
is not a major issue in the regression analyses. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Results of Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4 shows the regression models used to test the relationship of firm performance with 
family ownership and control features. The analysis is based on a fixed-effects panel regression, 
with year and industry dummy variables. The results show that family firms (FAM) are more 
likely to perform better, implying that the alignment effect is more apparent in family firms than 
in non-family firms (ß = 0.090, p < 0.01). Further, we examine the effects of family ownership 
configurations on firm performance. It is documented that family ownership (FOWN) is 
positively related to Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) (ß = 0.201, p < 0.01), whereas the divergence 
between cash flow and voting rights held by family owners (FDIV) is negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q (ß = -0.242, p < 0.05). These findings are consistent with suggestions in prior studies 
that greater family ownership has an alignment effect, but that family owners with excessive 
control power arising from greater cash–vote divergence are more likely to be entrenched (e.g., 
Fan & Wong, 2005; Shlefer & Vishny, 1997; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). 
In addition, we investigate the association between the family identity of the CEO and firm 
performance. We find that the presences of both founder CEOs (FF_CEO) and professional 
family firm CEOs (FH_CEO) are positively related to Tobin’s Q (ß = 0.153, p < 0.01; ß = 0.108, 
p < 0.01). This suggests that the alignment effect prevails in family firms managed by founder 
CEOs and professional CEOs. However, there is no significant relationship between the presence 
of descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and Tobin’s Q, indicating that neither the alignment effect nor 
the entrenchment effect prevails in a firm run by a descendant CEO. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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Next, the agency effects of family firms and the associated characteristics of family ownership, 
cash–vote divergence, and family identities of CEOs are analyzed. Table 5 presents the results of 
the logistic regression models used to examine the relationship of auditor choices with these 
family ownership and control features. The fixed effects of year and industry are controlled in 
the models. The results show that family firms (FAM) are less likely to appoint Big N auditors 
than non-family firms (ß = -0.199, p < 0.01). We further examine the effects of two different 
family ownership features, and find that both family ownership (FOWN) and the disparity 
between cash flow and voting rights (FDIV) are negatively related to the presence of Big N 
auditors, which is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2 (ß = -0.634, p < 0.01; ß = -1.407, p < 0.01). 
With regard to the family identity of the CEO, our findings reveal that the presence of both 
founder CEOs (FF_CEO) and professional CEOs (FH_CEO) is inversely associated with the 
appointment of Big N auditors, in line with Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3 (ß = -0.303, p < 0.01; ß = -
0.214, p < 0.01). However, there is no significant relationship between the presence of 
descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and auditor choice: this result does not support Hypothesis 3.2. 
Taken altogether, firms with family ownership (FOWN), founder CEOs (FF_CEO), 
professional CEOs (FH_CEO), and cash–vote divergence (FDIV) are unanimously disinclined to 
appoint higher-quality auditors, despite the fact that these family ownership and control 
mechanisms feature two distinct agency effects (i.e., the alignment effect and the entrenchment 
effect). As argued earlier, family owners and outside investors have opposing demands for 
auditor quality (Dao et al., 2012; Trotman & Trotman, 2010). Our findings reflect the net effects 
of these two sources of demands for auditor quality based on different agency scenarios, and 
imply that the outcome of auditor choice within family firms is determined in different ways. 
Family firms do not tend to appoint higher-quality auditors when family alignment is present, 
due to lower outside investor demand for such auditors. Although family entrenchment may 
create greater outside investor demand for higher-quality auditors, the dominant family owners 
are less likely to allow such demand to be realized. Additionally, descendant CEOs do not 
apparently coincide with the alignment effect or the entrenchment effect, nor do firms with 
descendant CEOs show a clear propensity relating to auditor choice. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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Additional Analysis 
We perform two additional analyses in relation to the effects of family ownership and control 
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features on auditor choice. First, we examine whether the aforementioned effects of family 
ownership and control characteristics on auditor choice are dependent on the frequency of equity 
offerings, operational risk, organizational complexity, and corporate opacity. Prior studies have 
argued that external demand for monitoring from higher-quality auditors is likely to be more 
intensive when firms have greater conflicts of interest and information asymmetry problems 
between insiders and outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
Because such agency problems are usually more severe in firms with more frequent equity 
offerings, operational risk, organizational complexity, and corporate opacity, such firms 
consequently face higher external demand for higher-quality auditors (e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; 
Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991; Fan & Wong, 2005; Wootton & Tone, 1993). 
We measure frequent equity issuers using a dummy variable, ISSUE. We count the number of 
years in which the firm issues equity and scale the number by the total number of available 
annual observations for the firms. A value of one is given if the frequency of that firm’s equity 
offerings is greater than or equal to the sample median, and zero otherwise. A firm’s operational 
risk (ORISK) is measured by the five-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets (Datar et 
al., 1991), and organizational complexity (COMPLE) is measured according to industry 
diversification (Liu & Lai, 2012).7 An organization is expected to be more complex if its 
industry diversification is greater. Following Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009), we develop an 
index to measure the opacity of a firm (OPACITY).8 Lower values denote greater transparency, 
and higher values denote a more opaque firm. Table 6 shows that Taiwanese firms with a higher 
frequency of equity offerings (ISSUE), operational risk (ORISK), organizational complexity 
(COMPLE), and opacity (OPACITY) are more likely to appoint Big N auditors. These results 
reflect that, in general, higher-quality auditors tend to be appointed in response to higher external 
demand for such auditors, in situations with greater potential for agency conflicts and/or 
information asymmetry. 
The interaction terms between ISSUE, ORISK, COMPLE, and OPACITY, and each of the 
family ownership and control features, are used to capture the effects of ISSUE, ORISK, 
COMPLE, and OPACITY on the relationship between family ownership and control and auditor 
choice. As can be seen in Table 6, Panel A, the interaction terms between ISSUE and FAM 
(FAM*ISSUE), FOWN (FOWN*ISSUE), FDIV (FDIV*ISSUE), FF_CEO (FF_CEO*ISSUE), 
and FH_CEO (FH_CEO*ISSUE) are negatively associated with the appointment of Big N 
auditors (ß = -0.628, p < 0.01; ß = -1.802, p < 0.05; ß = -2.399, p < 0.1; ß = -0.913, p < 0.1; ß =   
-0.703, p < 0.05). The interaction term between ISSUE and FD_CEO (FD_CEO*ISSUE) is not 
significantly associated with auditor choice. Similar results appear for the interactive effects 
between the six family ownership and control features and ORISK (Panel B), COMPLE (Panel 
C), and OPACITY (Panel D). Taken altogether, the findings imply that the perceived alignment 
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benefits of FAM, FOWN, FF_CEO, and FH_CEO remain effective in keeping the demand of 
outside investors for higher-quality auditors low, even though firms are in situations with greater 
potential agency conflicts and/or information asymmetry. However, entrenched family control in 
firms with greater FDIV still drives firms to appoint lower-quality auditors, even if the firms face 
a stronger demand for monitoring by top-tier auditors in such situations. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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Second, different types of outside investors may have different levels of influence on their 
investees. We examine the effects of shareholdings held by foreign investors (FOREIGN), 
pressure resistant investors (RESIST), pressure sensitive investors (SENSIT), and individual 
blockholders (IND_OWN) on auditor choice, and test whether such effects are dependent on 
family ownership and control features. The results are presented in Table 7. 
Foreign investors, pressure-resistant investors, and pressure-sensitive investors are 
institutional shareholders. FOREIGN is measured by taking the percentage of common shares 
held by foreign investors. It has been argued that Taiwan’s capital market is very sensitive to the 
trading behaviors of foreign investors (Huang & Shiu, 2009). Institutional investors are very 
concerned with the level of information asymmetry in their investees, and have a significant 
influence on a firm’s financial reporting behaviors (Liang, Lin, & Chin, 2012). 
Pressure-resistant investors include foundations, mutual and pension funds, hedge funds, and 
venture capitalists/private equity (Muniandy, Tanewski, & Johl, 2016). RESIST is measured by 
the percentage of common shares held by these institutional investors. Pressure-sensitive 
investors include banks, and finance and insurance investors (Muniandy et al., 2016). SENSIT is 
defined as the percentage of common shares held by these investors. Prior studies argue that 
pressure-resistant investors, compared with pressure-sensitive investors, are more active and 
effective monitors (Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007; Hutchinson, Seamer, & Chapple, 2015). They 
have access to greater resources and expertise in exercising direct oversight of their investees. 
Therefore, pressure-resistant investors would have a stronger monitoring influence than pressure-
sensitive investors on a firm’s auditor choice. IND_OWN is measured by the percentage of 
common shares held by outside individual blockholders. Compared with institutional investors, 
individual investors have less ability and resources to impose pressure on corporate management 
(Holderness, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006); they are therefore less likely to have an effect on a 
firm’s auditor choice. 
Table 7 shows that Taiwanese firms with greater ownership held by foreign investors 
(FOREIGN) and pressure-resistant investors (RESIST) are more likely to appoint Big N auditors. 
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However, auditor choice has no significant relationship with pressure-sensitive investors 
(SENSIT) and individual blockholders (IND_OWN). Consistent with the suggestions of prior 
research (Huang & Shiu, 2009; Hutchinson et al., 2015), these findings indicate that foreign 
investors and pressure-resistant investors have a stronger monitoring effect on their investees 
than pressure-sensitive investors and individual investors. 
Furthermore, we use the interaction terms between FOREIGN, RESIST, SENSIT, and 
IND_OWN, and each type of family ownership and control features discussed previously, to test 
whether the relationships between FOREIGN, RESIST, SENSIT, IND_OWN, and auditor choice 
are conditional on family ownership and control. As reported in Table 7, Panel A, the interaction 
terms between FOREIGN and FAM (FAM*FOREIGN), FOWN (FOWN*FOREIGN), FDIV 
(FDIV*FOREIGN), FF_CEO (FF_CEO*FOREIGN), and FH_CEO (FH_CEO*FOREIGN) are 
negatively associated with the appointment of Big N auditors (ß = -1.026, p < 0.01; ß = -2.228; p 
< 0.01; ß = -3.006, p < 0.05; ß = -1.513, p < 0.05; ß = -0.878, p < 0.05). The interaction term 
between FOREIGN and FD_CEO (FD_CEO*FOREIGN) is not significantly associated with 
auditor choice. Similar results appear in the interactive effects between RESIST and the six 
family ownership and control features (Panel B). Collectively, these findings imply that the 
alignment effect of FAM, FOWN, FF_CEO and FH_CEO may mitigate the demands of 
influential outside investors for monitoring by higher-quality auditors. The demand of influential 
outside investors for higher-quality auditors cannot counterbalance the lower demand of 
entrenched family owners empowered by greater FDIV for such auditors. In addition, as shown 
in Panel C and Panel D of Table 7, the interactive effects between SENSIT, IND_OWN, and all 
six family ownership and control features on auditor choice are not significant, suggesting that 
SENSIT and IND_OWN have an insignificant impact on auditor choice, and this effect does not 
vary among firms with different family ownership and control features. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Robustness Analysis 
Additional robustness analysis is performed in order to understand the effects of family 
ownership and control features on auditor choice. First, we measure the quality of audit services 
by using two alternative proxies: auditor industry specialization (INSPEC) and audit fees 
(AUDIT_FEE). We measure INSPEC as the proportion of firms in an industry that are clients of 
the auditor, and AUDIT_FEE by taking the natural logarithms of audit fees paid by the firms. 
Auditors with greater industry specialization or receiving higher audit fees are more likely to 
provide better-quality services (e.g., Fan & Wong, 2005; Ho & Kang, 2013). In addition, audit 
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fees may also be viewed as a reflection of a firm’s audit risk. It is suggested that the magnitude 
of the audit fee is also a consequence of the auditors’ evaluation of their clients’ audit risk. In 
other words, auditors usually charge their clients a rate that appropriately reflects the cost of the 
auditing effort associated with the perceived audit risk (e.g., Bédard & Johnstone, 2004). Table 8 
reports the effects of the family ownership and control features on both auditor industry 
specialization and audit fees. It can be seen that the findings are generally consistent with the 
main findings presented in Table 5. The only exception is that FDIV shows a significantly 
positive relationship with AUDIT_FEE (ß = 1.426, p < 0.01), implying that auditors perceive 
higher audit risk when they provide services to family firms with greater cash–vote divergence: 
such firms may therefore be charged higher audit fees. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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It has been argued that the controlling power of family owners is further enhanced when the 
families dominate more board seats than their ownership warrants (Anderson et al., 2009). We 
therefore examine how the degree of disproportionate board control held by family owners 
(FDIV_BOARD) affects Tobin’s Q and auditor choice. We measure FDIV_BOARD as the 
difference between the percentage of board members dominated by the founding families and the 
percentage of voting rights controlled by them. Table 9 shows that FDIV_BOARD is negatively 
related to both Tobin’s Q and AUDITOR, which is in line with the findings for cash–vote 
divergence (FDIV) obtained in our primary tests (see Tables 4 and 5). In addition, we use the 
ratio of voting rights divided by cash flow rights held by family owners (FDIV_Ratio) as an 
alternative measurement of the degree of disparity between these two rights (Shyu & Lee, 2009). 
The results are also consistent with the main findings generated based on FDIV, as shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
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Panel B of Table 1 shows that family presence is dominant in certain industries (i.e., 
Automobile, Rubber, and Cement). We therefore conduct robustness tests based on a sample 
which does not include firms in these three industries, in order to rule out the possibility that the 
results are driven by those firms. The findings in relation to the effects of FAM, FOWN, FDIV, 
FF_CEO, FD_CEO, and FH_CEO on Tobin’s Q and AUDITOR are largely the same as the main 
tests; see Table 10. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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A potential endogeneity problem may exist between family ownership configurations (i.e., 
FOWN and FDIV), firm performance, and auditor choice (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). This potential issue is addressed by employing a two-stage model in which the 
instrumental variables in the first stage are the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure (CSR_DIS) (Dyre & Whetten, 2006; Eulaiwi, Al-Hadi, Taylor, Al-Yahyaee, & Evansa, 
2016) and lagged diversification (LAG_DIV) (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006). CSR_DIS is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the firm discloses CSR 
activities, and zero otherwise. LAG_DIV is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales in the previous 
year. 
Table 11 reports that, in the first stage, CSR_DIS has a significantly positive relationship with 
FOWN (Models (2) and (5)), whereas there is a significantly negative association between 
CSR_DIS and FDIV (Models (3) and (6)). LAG_DIV has significantly positive relationships with 
both FOWN (Models (2) and (5)) and FDIV (Models (3) and (6)). In the second stage, we find 
that the predicted FOWN (PFOWN) is positively associated with Tobin’s Q (ß = 0.290, p < 0.05), 
but the predicted FDIV (PFDIV) is negatively related to Tobin’s Q (ß = -0.340, p < 0.05) (Model 
1). Both PFOWN and PFDIV are negatively related to AUDITOR (ß = -0.860, p < 0.01; ß = -
1.083, p < 0.01) (Model (4)). These findings are consistent with the main test results. Table 11 
also reports the tests of the C statistic, the Hansen’s J statistic, and the Anderson-Rubin F 
statistic. The C statistic is adopted to test the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous 
variables can be treated as exogenous. The results of the C statistic reject the null hypothesis that 
FOWN and FDIV may be treated as exogenous at the 5% significance level. The Hansen’s J 
statistic is used for testing the over-identifying restrictions. The results of this test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the structural errors term in the 
second-stage regressions. Furthermore, the Anderson-Rubin F statistic is used as a test for the 
weak-instrument robust inference. The results reject the null hypothesis that the endogenous 
repressors are irrelevant at the 1% significance level, suggesting that the employed instruments 
are not weak. Overall, the results of these three tests provide support for the validity and 
relevance of the employed instrumental variables and of the key findings. 
Finally, we examine the potential nonlinear relationships between family ownership, firm 
performance, and auditor choice. Wang (2006) found a nonlinear association between family 
ownership and earnings quality in the S&P 500 firms. In addition, Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001) 
found a nonlinear relation between family control and firm performance in a sample of 
Taiwanese firms. We address this potential issue of non-linearity by adding the square of family 
ownership (SqFOWN) into the models used in Tables 4 and 5. Table 11 shows that SqFOWN is 
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not significantly associated with either Tobin’s Q (Model (7)) or AUDITOR (Model (8)), 
suggesting that there is no significant non-linear relationship between family ownership, firm 
performance, and auditor choice. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Auditor choice is one of the most important decisions a firm has to make, and has significant 
implications for financial reporting quality and transparency. Despite abundant research on 
auditor choice, it remains an under-researched issue in family firms (Ho & Kang, 2013; Trotman 
& Trotman, 2010). Drawing from agency perspectives, this study emphasizes distinctive agency 
effects arising from family ownership, cash–vote divergence, CEO identity, and the impact of 
family ownership and control features on auditor choice. Our analysis is focused on Taiwan, in 
which family firms are prevalent, and where the capital market is characterized by weak 
shareholder protection. 
We find that auditor choices of family firms differ those of their non-family counterparts, with 
the former being less likely to appoint Big N auditors. Our results further suggest that different 
family ownership and control configurations result in different agency effects. The alignment 
effect prevails in family firms with greater family ownership, founder CEOs, and professional 
CEOs. In contrast, the entrenchment effect is prevalent when there is greater cash–vote 
divergence. Despite the occurrence of two distinct types of agency effects in firms with different 
family ownership and control features, these firms are all disinclined to hire Big N auditors. 
Additionally, we find that neither the alignment effect nor the entrenchment effect is apparent in 
family firms with descendant CEOs. Thus, the presence of these CEOs is not related to the 
choice of auditor. 
Our findings lead to a number of theoretical and policy implications. First, this study 
highlights the heterogeneous features relating to family ownership and control within family 
firms. Our findings reveal the nature of agency effects embedded in family ownership, cash–vote 
divergence, and the family identities of CEOs, and suggest that these ownership and control 
features constitute important determinants of auditor choice. Second, these results advance our 
understanding of the net effects of the interaction between the demands of family owners and 
outside investors on a firm’s auditor choice, in terms of different agency scenarios of family 
ownership and control. Our empirical evidence suggests that family firms do not tend to appoint 
higher-quality auditors due to lower outside investor demand when family alignment is present. 
Although family entrenchment may create greater outside investor demand for higher-quality 
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auditors, the entrenched family owners may make such demand difficult to realize. Finally, this 
study offers practical insights regarding how family firms with different family ownership and 
control features view and value external auditing, and consequently shape their auditor choices. 
In particular, given the entrenchment characteristics of cash–vote divergence, policymakers 
should focus on the potential threat to financial reporting quality that arises in the absence of 
monitoring by higher-quality auditors, as a result of family owners possessing enhanced control 
power beyond their cash flow rights. 
However, we acknowledge that our research has some limitations, which may be addressed in 
future. First, this study focused on the observable structural features of family firms. This may 
lead to underestimation of the effects of the unobservable attitudes of controlling family owners 
and outside investors toward the value of external audits. Second, although private family firms 
are a common feature around the world, we confined our analysis to listed family firms. Listed 
and private family firms are generally different in size, organizational structure, and institutional 
situation. For example, they are likely to have different corporate lifecycle stages and to function 
in different regulatory environments. Furthermore, listed family firms, compared with private 
ones, are also more likely to access equity markets in order to raise additional capital. Therefore, 
it is not clear whether our findings would be replicated for small, private family firms. 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
1. See the detailed discussion below, in the section entitled “Family Firms and Corporate Governance in Taiwan.” 
2. Unlike in Taiwan, audit firms in other countries (e.g., the United States or the United Kingdom) can be formed as 
entities with limited liability. Individual partners in audit firms with unlimited liability face higher levels of 
potential liability than those in firms with limited liability. Prior research has demonstrated that audit quality is 
higher when auditors have unlimited liability than when they have limited liability (Dye, 1995). 
3. The “Big N auditors” refers to the Big 4 or the Big 5 auditors. Before June 1, 2003, Taiwan’s top-tier audit firms 
were the Big 5, namely T.N. Soong & Co. (an affiliate of Arthur Andersen), PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Deloitte and Touche, and Ernst & Young. Following the Enron scandal and Andersen’s consequent ceasing of 
operations on August 31, 2002, T.N. Soong & Co. merged with Deloitte and Touche on June 1, 2003. The clients 
of T.N. Soong were also transferred to Deloitte and Touche. Consequently, after June 1, 2003, Taiwan’s top-tier 
audit firms became the Big 4, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Touche, and Ernst & Young. 
Accordingly, before 2003, our measure of auditor quality (AUDITOR) measures top-tier designation according to 
whether the auditor belongs to one of the Big 5 audit firms. After 2003, AUDITOR measures auditor quality 
according to whether the auditor belongs to one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
4. Business Groups in Taiwan is a book published annually by the China Credit Information Services Ltd. 
5. See Endnote 3 for the historical development of Big N audit firms in Taiwan. 
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6. The voting rights held by family owners (FVR) include shareholdings that are not directly owned, but are still 
controlled by the family member over direct cash flow rights. The data for voting rights is obtained from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. This database follows the measure used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999) to define voting rights, which include shareholdings directly owned and indirectly controlled 
by ultimate controlling shareholders. 
7. Industrial Diversification =Σi [Pi ln(1/Pi)], where Pi is the proportion of sales generated in industry segment i, and 
ln(1/Pi) is the weight given to each industry segment i. 
8. According to Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009), the opacity index is developed by ranking four individual proxies 
for opacity (i.e., trading volume, bid–ask spread, analyst following, and analyst forecast errors) into deciles, with 
the most opaque firms taking a value of ten and the least opaque firms assuming a value of one. The four rankings 
are then summed and scaled by a factor of 40 to provide an index that ranges from 0.1 to 1.0 for each sample firm. 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of the Sample Firms 
Panel A: Distribution crossing years 
Year All (n) Family (n) Non-family (n) Family (%) 
1996 325 234 91 72.00% 
1997 407 298 109 73.21% 
1998 388 272 116 70.10% 
1999 471 313 158 66.45% 
2000 549 375 174 68.31% 
2001 578 408 170 70.58% 
2002 618 418 200 67.63% 
2003 767 493 274 64.27% 
2004 894 595 299 66.55% 
2005 989 627 362 63.39% 
2006 1089 688 401 63.17% 
2007 1139 719 420 63.13% 
2008 996 629 367 63.15% 
2009 965 588 377 60.93% 
2010 963 596 367 61.88% 
2011 979 595 384 60.77% 
2012 998 605 393 60.62% 
2013 1029 636 393 61.81% 
2014 1032 663 369 64.24% 
2015 1049 659 390 62.82% 
Total 16,225 10,411 5,814 64.17% 
Panel B: Distribution crossing industries  
TEJ code Industry name All (n)  Family (n) Non-family (n) Family (%) 
11 Cement 116 104 12 89.65% 
12 Foods 521 450 71 86.37% 
13 Plastics 573 417 156 72.77% 
14 Textiles 1,036 708 328 68.33% 
15 Electric Machinery 921 506 415 54.94% 
16 Electrical and Cable 255 162 93 63.52% 
17 Chemical, Biotechnology and Medical 1,038 744 294 71.67% 
18 Glass, Ceramics 113 99 14 87.61% 
19 Paper, Pulp 126 109 17 86.50% 
20 Iron and Steel 497 389 108 78.26% 
21 Rubber 354 329 25 92.94% 
22 Automobile 103 98 5 95.15% 
23 Electron 7,836 4,267 3,569 54.45% 
25 Building Materials and Construction 837 571 266 68.21% 
26 Shipping and Transportation 474 365 109 77.00% 
27 Tourism 251 216 35 86.27% 
29 Trading and Consumer Goods 347 268 79 77.23% 
99 Others 827 609 218 73.63% 
Total  16,225 10,411 5,814 64.17% 
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                                                                        TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Ownership and control characteristics of the 10,411 family firms 
Characteristics  Characteristics  
1. FOWN, mean 34% 5. FF_CEO 23% 
2. FVR, mean 42% 6. FD_CEO 31% 
3. Family firms with cash-vote divergence 44% 7. FH_CEO 46% 
4. FDIV, mean 8%   
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for full sample (No. of obs. = 16,225)   
Variables Mean Std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Tobin’s Q 1.374 1.215 1.155 0.368 5.127 
AUDITOR 0.803 0.352 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 15.256 1.499 15.095 12.534 19.425 
AGE 11.595 7.148 10.000 0.000 43.000 
LEV 0.415 0.171 0.412 0.082 0.785 
LOSS 0.175 0.394 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.053 0.103 0.058 -0.129 0.297 
CAPITAL 0.079 0.070 0.058 0.013 0.124 
R&D 0.057 0.150 0.042 0.000 0.101 
FIRM_RISK 0.174 0.104 0.149 0.029 0.347 
GROWTH 0.204 0.424 0.126 -0.268 0.942 
BOARD_SIZE 9.431 3.512 9.000 3.000 29.000 
IND_BOARD 0.142 0.159 0.136 0.000 0.684 
AUDIT_COMMIT 0.077 0.266 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DUALITY 
BLOCK_OWN 
0.319 
0.358 
0.461 
0.213 
0.000 
0.336 
0.000 
0.156 
1.000 
0.509 
Panel C: Comparison of firm characteristics between family firms and non-family firms 
Variables 
Family firms 
(No. of obs. = 10,411) 
 
 
Non-family firms 
(No. of obs.= 5,814)  Difference in 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Means (t-stat) 
Medians 
(z-stat) 
Tobin’s Q 1.499  1.389  1.149  1.128   0.350*** (3.305) 
0.261*** 
(3.196) 
AUDITOR 0.755 1.000  0.887  1.000  -0.132*** (-4.413) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.381) 
SIZE 15.612 15.368  14.617 14.425  0.995*** (5.400) 
0.943*** 
(5.067) 
AGE 13.042  13.000  9.004  9.000   4.038*** (3.555) 
4.000*** 
(3.769) 
LEV 0.403  0.372  0.436  0.412  -0.033** (-2.222) 
-0.040** 
(-2.338) 
LOSS 0.163  0.000  0.197  0.000   -0.034* (-1.737) 
-0.001* 
(-1.655) 
ROA 0.062  0.057  0.037  0.033  0.025** (2.181) 
0.024** 
(2.308) 
CAPITAL 0.085  0.070  0.068  0.056   0.017 (1.405) 
0.014 
(1.330) 
R&D 0.062  0.049  0.048  0.040   0.014 (1.602) 
0.009 
(1.290) 
FIRM_RISK 0.151 0.148  0.214  0.195   -0.063** (-2.309) 
-0.047** 
(-2.219) 
GROWTH 0.222  0.206  0.173  0.158   0.049** (2.185) 
0.048** 
(2.305) 
BOARD_SIZE 10.143  10.000  8.155 8.000  1.988*** (4.318) 
2.000*** 
(4.794) 
IND_BOARD 0.154  0.144  0.120  0.109   0.034 (1.146) 
0.035 
(1.635) 
AUDIT_COMMIT 0.085  0.000  0.063 0.000   0.022** (2.191) 
0.001** 
(2.436) 
DUALITY 0.401  0.000  0.172  0.000   0.229*** (3.966) 
0.001*** 
(4.211) 
BLOCK_OWN 0.382 0.379  0.317 0.301  0.065*** (3.941) 
0.078*** 
(4.015) 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. FOWN is the percentage of common shares held by the family members. FVR is the 
percentage of voting rights held by the family members. FDIV is measured as the difference between FVR and FOWN. FF_CEO is a dummy variable with a value of 
one if the position of CEO is held by the family founder, and zero otherwise. FD_CEO is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the position of CEO is 
held by a descendant, and zero otherwise. FH_CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the family firm has a professional CEO, and zero otherwise. Tobin's Q is the 
sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of preferred stock, and the book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. AUDITOR 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for firms with Big N auditors, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. AGE is the number of years since 
incorporation of the firm. LEV is calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has reported a net 
loss in the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPITAL is the ratio of capital expenditures to 
total property, plants and equipment. R&D is the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. FIRM_RISK is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns for the prior 36 months. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales over the last three years. BOARD_SIZE is the number of directors on board. IND_BOARD is 
the percentage of independent directors on board. AUDIT_COMMIT is a dummy variable with a value of one if the company has an audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable with a value of one if the positions of CEO and chairman are held by one person, and zero otherwise. BLOCK_OWN is the percentage of 
common shares held by external blockholders. T-test and Mann-Whitney U test are adopted to examine differences in mean and median, respectively (two-tailed test). 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01.
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TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix of all variables used in our regression analyses. Coefficients in bold indicate that the correlations are significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed test). See Table 2 
for detailed variable definitions. 
 
 
 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 
1. Tobin’s Q 1                      
2. AUDITOR 0.029  1                     
3. FAM 0.044  -0.051  1                    
4. FOWN 0.062  -0.074  0.013  1                   
5. FDIV -0.036  -0.049  0.015  0.039 1                  
6. FF_CEO 0.028  -0.036  0.018  0.066 0.046  1                 
7. FD_CEO 0.022  -0.029  0.015  0.054 0.037  0.069 1                
8. FH_CEO 0.016  -0.023  0.021  0.031 0.029  0.023 0.077  1               
9. SIZE 0.034  0.027  0.039  0.022 0.035  0.057 0.062  0.085 1              
10. AGE -0.008  0.022  0.082  0.076 0.088  0.074 0.096  0.109 0.010  1             
11. LEV -0.017  0.031  -0.026  -0.033 -0.027  -0.023 -0.038  -0.042 0.001  0.017 1            
12. LOSS -0.026  0.058  -0.033  -0.029 -0.035  -0.027 -0.039  -0.035 0.018  0.001 0.010  1           
13. ROA 0.143  0.123  0.135  0.147 0.125  0.118 0.109  0.134 -0.006  0.031 0.038  0.006 1          
14. CAPITAL 0.034  0.041  0.014  0.022 0.019  0.022 0.030  0.028 -0.007  -0.011 0.037  0.024 0.032  1         
15. R&D 0.046  0.025  0.021  0.030 0.034  0.024 0.023  0.021 0.018  -0.012 -0.045  0.023 -0.038  -0.006  1        
16. FIRM_RISK -0.027  -0.028  -0.026  -0.019 -0.021  -0.025 -0.034  -0.042 0.041  0.032 0.075  -0.028 -0.030  0.043  -0.005 1       
17. GROWTH 0.053  0.080  0.031  0.039 0.042  0.034 0.052  0.068 -0.006  0.075 0.146  0.047 0.232  0.134  0.035 -0.002 1      
18. BOARD_SIZE -0.096  0.134  0.018  0.014 0.023  0.032 0.065  0.077 -0.003  -0.011 -0.037  0.091 0.019  0.031  0.109 -0.082 -0.003  1     
19. IND_BOARD 0.081  0.097  0.022  0.020 0.027  0.041 0.057  0.061 -0.018  -0.005 -0.022  -0.023 -0.002  -0.011  0.025 0.028 -0.131  0.023  1    
20. AUDIT_COMMIT 0.026  0.033  0.031  0.042 0.038  0.059 0.051 0.075 0.036  -0.03 -0.078  -0.014 0.037  0.052  -0.009 0.047 0.045  0.127  0.031 1   
21. DUALITY -0.032 -0.014 0.056 0.045 0.051 0.067 0.087 0.101 0.081 0.062 0.130 -0.049 -0.062 -0.054 0.042 -0.017 0.064 0.035 0.058 -0.067 1  
22. BLOCK_OWN 0.058 0.065 0.089 -0.026 0.047 0.033 0.025 0.016 0.057 -0.030 -0.011 0.166 0.038 0.049 -0.055 0.062 0.107 0.046 0.021 0.054 -0.033 1 
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TABLE 4 
The Associations between Family Ownership and Control and Firm Performance 
This table reports the effects of the presence of family firms (FAM), family ownership (FOWN), cash-vote divergence (FDIV), the presences of 
founder CEOs (FF_CEO), descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and professional CEOs (FH_CEO) on the Tobin’s Q. See Table 2 for detailed variable 
definitions. Fixed effects of years and industries are included in the regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based 
on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 1.723*** (3.554) 
1.882*** 
(3.671)  
1.835*** 
(3.265) 
FAM 0.090*** (3.188)   
FOWN   0.201*** (2.598)  
FDIV  -0.242** (-2.505)  
FF_CEO   0.153*** (3.620) 
FD_CEO   0.051 (1.118) 
FH_CEO   0.108*** (3.363) 
BOARD_SIZE -1.127** (-2.445) 
-1.134** 
(-2.461)  
-1.172** 
(-2.543) 
IND_BOARD 1.421*** (2.615) 
1.433*** 
(2.641)  
1.478*** 
(2.719) 
AUDIT_COMMIT 1.274 (1.260) 
1.282 
(1.268)  
1.325 
(1.310) 
DUALITY -1.056 (-1.318) 
-1.063 
(-1.326)  
-1.098 
(-1.371) 
BLOCK_OWN 1.459** (2.243) 
1.468** 
(2.258)  
1.517** 
(2.333) 
SIZE 0.102*** (3.361) 
0.105*** 
(4.541)  
0.099*** 
(4.065) 
AGE -0.025*** (-2.737) 
-0.030*** 
(-2.926)  
-0.032*** 
(-2.780) 
LEV -0.109** (-2.130) 
-0.112** 
(-2.110)  
-0.108** 
(-2.068) 
CAPITAL 1.102* (1.907) 
1.105* 
(1.872)  
1.102* 
(1.883) 
R&D 1.917*** (2.911) 
1.890*** 
(3.098)  
1.922*** 
(3.094) 
FIRM_RISK -0.043*** (-3.109) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.051)  
-0.042*** 
(-3.137) 
GROWTH 0.138** (1.984) 
0.139** 
(1.999)  
0.142** 
(1.991) 
Adjusted R2 0.509 0.515 0.537 
F-statistic 5.913*** 5.946***  6.045*** 
No. of obs. 16,225 16,225 16,225 
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TABLE 5 
The Associations between Family Ownership and Control and Auditor Choice 
This table reports the effects of the presence of family firms (FAM), family ownership (FOWN), cash-vote divergence (FDIV), the presences of 
founder CEOs (FF_CEO), descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and professional CEOs (FH_CEO) on auditor choice (AUDITOR). See Table 2 for 
detailed variable definitions. Fixed effects of years and industries are included in the regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics based on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
 
Variables Dependent variable: AUDITOR (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.337** (2.115)  
0.340** 
(2.221)  
0.328** 
(2.181)  
FAM -0.199*** (-4.144)    
FOWN   -0.634*** (-5.126)  
FDIV  -1.407*** (-3.323)  
FF_CEO   -0.303*** (-5.197)  
FD_CEO   -0.122 (-1.114)  
FH_CEO   -0.214*** (-4.116)  
BOARD_SIZE 0.113** (2.179)  
0.115** 
(2.344)  
0.108** 
(2.372)  
IND_BOARD 0.375** (2.329)  
0.379** 
(2.253) 
0.383** 
(2.419)  
AUDIT_COMMIT 0.244* (1.722)  
0.235* 
(1.694)  
0.234* 
(1.912)  
DUALITY -0.050 (-1.174)  
-0.052 
(-1.228)  
-0.054 
(-1.148)  
BLOCK_OWN 0.450** (2.198)  
0.443** 
(2.212)  
0.447** 
(2.286)  
SIZE 0.064*** (3.827)  
0.067*** 
(3.939)  
0.073*** 
(4.015)  
AGE 0.019*** (2.680)  
0.024*** 
(2.811)  
0.027*** 
(2.985)  
LEV 0.045** (2.003)  
0.046** 
(2.018)  
0.048** 
(2.097)  
LOSS 0.084* (1.728)  
0.092* 
(1.855)  
0.098** 
(2.005)  
ROA 0.092** (2.373)  
0.094** 
(2.349)  
0.097** 
(2.422)  
Log-likelihood 183.700***  189.291*** 221.626***  
No. of obs. 16,225 16,225 16,225 
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TABLE 6 
 Organizational Situations and the Effects of Family Ownership and Control on Auditor Choice 
Panel A: Issuing Frequency Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO ISSUE FAM× ISSUE 
FOWN× 
ISSUE 
FDIV× 
ISSUE 
FF_CEO× 
ISSUE 
FD_CEO× 
ISSUE 
FH_CEO× 
ISSUE Log-likelihood 
(1) -0.316*** (-3.821)       
0.088** 
(2.198)  
-0.628*** 
(-3.829)       220.178***  
(2)  -0.794** (-2.133) 
-1.894*** 
(-2.787)    
0.095* 
(1.841)   
-1.802** 
(-2.515)  
-2.399* 
(-1.880)    211.761***  
(3)    -0.423** (-2.080)  
-0.096 
(-0.982)  
-0.348* 
(-1.902)  
0.094* 
(1.677)     
-0.913* 
(-1.656)  
-0.185 
(-1.143)  
-0.703** 
(-2.437)  230.656*** 
Panel B: Operational Risk Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO ORISK FAM× ORISK 
FOWN× 
ORISK 
FDIV× 
ORISK 
FF_CEO×  
ORISK 
FD_CEO× 
ORISK 
FH_CEO× 
ORISK Log-likelihood 
(4) -0.285** (-2.557)       
0.115** 
(2.552)  
-0.567** 
(-2.207)       246.324***  
(5)  -0.638** (-2.524)  
-1.195*** 
(-2.845)    
0.105** 
(2.341)   
-1.131** 
(-2.190) 
-1.671*** 
(-2.773)    255.788*** 
(6)    -0.427*** (-3.255)  
-0.121 
(-1.464)  
-0.286** 
(-2.521)  
0.111* 
(1.899)     
-0.911*** 
(-3.267)  
-0.200 
(-1.298)  
-0.661* 
(-1.819)  270.316*** 
Panel C: Organizational Complexity Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO COMPLE FAM× COMPLE 
FOWN× 
COMPLE 
FDIV× 
COMPLE 
FF_CEO× 
COMPLE 
FD_CEO× 
COMPLE 
FH_CEO× 
COMPLE Log-likelihood 
(7) -0.262*** (-3.054)       
0.109*** 
(3.230)  
-0.422** 
(-2.041)       189.024***  
(8)  -0.624*** (-3.616)  
-1.259** 
(-1.962)    
0.116*** 
(2.643)   
-1.022* 
(-1.852)  
-1.566** 
(-2.020)    197.433***  
(9)    -0.481** (-2.017)  
-0.091 
(-1.556)  
-0.327* 
(-1.772)  
0.107*** 
(3.066)     
-0.772** 
(-2.101)  
-0.131 
(-1.142)  
-0.530** 
(-2.476)  219.150*** 
Panel D: Opacity/Transparency Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO OPACITY FAM× OPACITY 
FOWN× 
OPACITY 
FDIV× 
OPACITY 
FF_CEO× 
OPACITY 
FD_CEO× 
OPACITY 
FH_CEO× 
OPACITY Log-likelihood 
(10) -0.232*** (-4.569)       
0.214** 
(2.363)  
-0.476*** 
(-3.220)       223.647***  
(11)  -1.145** (-1.973)  
-2.317* 
(-1.866)    
0.217** 
(2.493)   
-2.389** 
(-2.196)  
-2.905*** 
(-3.313)    227.221***  
(12)    -0.467*** (-3.004)  
-0.071 
(-0.588)  
-0.235** 
(-2.179)  
0.208** 
(2.294)     
-0.908** 
(-2.006)  
-0.240 
(-1.169)  
0.561** 
(-2.402)  241.533*** 
This table shows the interactive effects of the family ownership and control features and the frequency of equity offerings (ISSUE), operational risk (ORISK), organizational complexity (COMPLE), and corporate opacity 
(OPACITY) on auditor choice. ISSUE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the frequency of that firm’s equity offerings is greater than or equal to the sample median, and zero otherwise. ORISK is measured 
by the five-year rolling standard deviation of return on assets.  COMPLE is measured based on industry diversification. OPACITY is the opacity index. Interaction terms between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, 
FH_CEO and ISSUE are FAM×ISSUE, FOWN×ISSUE, FDIV×ISSUE, FF_CEO×ISSUE, FD_CEO×ISSUE and FH_CEO×ISSUE, respectively. Interaction terms between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, 
FH_CEO and ORISK are FAM×ORISK, FOWN×ORISK, FDIV×ORISK, FF_CEO×ORISK, FD_CEO×ORISK and FH_CEO×ORISK, respectively. Interaction terms between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, 
FH_CEO and COMPLE are FAM×COMPLE, FOWN×COMPLE, FDIV×COMPLE, FF_CEO×COMPLE, FD_CEO×COMPLE and FH_CEO×COMPLE, respectively. Interaction terms between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, 
FF_CEO, FD_CEO, FH_CEO and OPACITY are FAM×OPACITY, FOWN×OPACITY, FDIV×OPACITY, FF_CEO×OPACITY, FD_CEO×OPACITY and FH_CEO×OPACITY, respectively. See Table 2 for the 
definitions of FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO and FH_CEO. Fixed effects of years and industries and control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
based on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
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TABLE 7 
Outside Investors and the Effects of Family Ownership and Control on Auditor Choice 
Panel A: Foreign Investors Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO FOREIGN FAM× FOREIGN 
FOWN× 
FOREIGN 
FDIV× 
FOREIGN 
FF_CEO× 
FOREIGN 
FD_CEO× 
FOREIGN 
FH_CEO× 
FOREIGN Log-likelihood 
(1) -0.270*** (-2.645)       
1.852*** 
(3.184)  
-1.026*** 
(-3.519)       236.821***  
(2)  -0.550*** (-3.848)  
-0.932* 
(-1.747)    
2.104*** 
(4.577)   
-2.228*** 
(-3.477)  
-3.006** 
(-2.492)    228.327*** 
(3)    -0.480** (-2.452)  
-0.125 
(-1.606)  
-0.269** 
(-2.067)  
1.993*** 
(4.205)     
-1.513** 
(-2.347)  
-0.466 
(-1.198)  
-0.878** 
(-2.116)  238.801*** 
Panel B: Pressure Resistant Investors Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO RESIST FAM× RESIST 
FOWN× 
RESIST 
FDIV× 
RESIST 
FF_CEO× 
RESIST 
FD_CEO× 
RESIST 
FH_CEO× 
RESIST Log-likelihood 
(4) -0.281** (-2.498)       
0.659** 
(2.066)  
-0.817*** 
(-3.212)       233.346***  
(5)  -0.500** (-2.158)  
-0.569* 
(-1.949)    
0.652** 
(2.404)   
-0.949*** 
(-3.077)  
 -1.489*** 
(-2.599)    223.474*** 
(6)    -0.636*** (-2.733)  
-0.170 
(-1.418)  
-0.391** 
(-2.230)  
0.685** 
(2.540)     
-1.512*** 
(-3.761)  
-0.403 
(-1.167)  
-0.960** 
(-2.365)  240.854*** 
Panel C: Pressure Sensitive Investors Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO SENSIT FAM× SENSIT 
FOWN× 
SENSIT 
FDIV× 
SENSIT 
FF_CEO× 
SENSIT 
FD_CEO× 
SENSIT 
FH_CEO× 
SENSIT Log-likelihood 
(7) -0.262*** (-3.381)      
0.531 
(1.329)  
-0.718 
(-1.198)       203.156***  
(8)  -0.436*** (-4.074)  
-0.547** 
(-2.432)    
0.497 
(1.359)   
-0.829 
(-1.177)  
-1.016 
(-1.197)    198.156***  
(9)    -0.587*** (-3.720)  
-0.110  
(-1.508) 
-0.234*** 
(-4.141)  
0.591 
(1.177)     
-1.805 
(-1.228)  
-0.409 
(-1.238)  
-0.816 
(-1.333)  217.237*** 
Panel D: Individual Blockholders Dimension 
Model FAM FOWN FDIV FF_CEO FD_CEO FH_CEO IND_OWN FAM× IND_OWN 
FOWN× 
IND_OWN 
FDIV× 
IND_OWN 
FF_CEO× 
IND_OWN 
FD_CEO× 
IND_OWN 
FH_CEO× 
IND_OWN Log-likelihood 
(10) -0.313*** (-3.592)       
0.421 
(1.532)  
-0.793 
(-1.396)       183.317***  
(11)  -0.510*** (-3.825)  
-0.579*** 
(-4.058)    
0.436 
(1.286)   
-1.020 
(-1.558)  
-2.209 
(-1.453)    192.200*** 
(12)    -0.540** (-2.355)  
-0.140 
(-1.532)  
-0.252* 
(-1.882)  
0.443 
(1.318)     
-1.827 
(-1.365)  
-0.493 
(-1.605)  
-0.897 
(-1.416)  208.200*** 
This table presents the interactive effects of the family ownership and control features and foreign investors (FOREIGN), pressure resistant investors (RESIST), pressure sensitive investors (SENSIT), and individual 
blockholders (IND_OWN) on auditor choice. FOREIGN is the percentage of common shares held by foreign investors. RESIST is the percentage of common shares held by pressure resistant investors. SENSIT is the 
percentage of common shares held by pressure sensitive investors. IND_OWN is the percentage of common shares held by outside individual blockholders. Interaction terms between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, 
FD_CEO, FH_CEO and FOREIGN are FAM×FOREIGN, FOWN×FOREIGN, FDIV×FOREIGN, FF_CEO×FOREIGN, FD_CEO×FOREIGN and FH_CEO×FOREIGN, respectively. Interaction terms between FAM, 
FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, FH_CEO and RESIST are FAM×RESIST, FOWN×RESIST, FDIV×RESIST, FF_CEO×RESIST, FD_CEO×RESIST and FH_CEO×RESIST, respectively. Interaction terms between 
FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, FH_CEO and SENSIT are FAM×SENSIT, FOWN×SENSIT, FDIV×SENSIT, FF_CEO×SENSIT, FD_CEO×SENSIT and FH_CEO×SENSIT, respectively. Interaction terms 
between FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO, FH_CEO and IND_OWN are FAM×IND_OWN, FOWN×IND_OWN, FDIV×IND_OWN, FF_CEO×IND_OWN, FD_CEO×IND_OWN and FH_CEO×IND_OWN, 
respectively. See Table 2 for the definitions of FAM, FOWN, FDIV, FF_CEO, FD_CEO and FH_CEO. Fixed effects of years and industries and control variables are included in the regressions but not reported. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
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TABLE 8 
Results obtained using Alternative Measures for Audit Quality 
This table reports the effects of the presence of family firms (FAM), family ownership (FOWN), cash-vote divergence (FDIV), the presences of 
founder CEOs (FF_CEO), descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and professional CEOs (FH_CEO) on the choice of industry-specialist auditors (INSPEC) 
and audit fees (AUDIT_FEE). INSPEC is the percentage of sales for all firms in industry that are audited by auditor of firm in industry to sales for 
all firms in industry. AUDIT_FEE is the natural logarithms of audit fees paid by the firms. See Table 2 for definitions of the other variables. Fixed 
effects of years and industries are included in the regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on clustered robust 
standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable:  
INSPEC 
Dependent variable:  
AUDIT_FEE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.593** (2.374)  
0.600** 
(2.441)  
0.585** 
(2.411)  
5.254*** 
(3.155)  
5.337*** 
(3.180)  
5.138*** 
(3.110)  
FAM -0.456** (-2.476)    
-0.536*** 
(-3.906)    
FOWN     -0.579*** (-3.078)   
-0.900*** 
(-4.522)   
FDIV  -0.817** (-2.149)   
1.426*** 
(3.679)  
FF_CEO   -0.562*** (-3.024)    
-0.775*** 
(-4.166)  
FD_CEO   -0.356 (1.077)   
-0.509 
(-1.421)  
FH_CEO   -0.472** (-2.070)   
-0.619** 
(-2.073)  
BOARD_SIZE 0.342* (1.958)  
0.336** 
(2.037)  
0.335** 
(2.242)     
IND_BOARD 0.625* (1.713)  
0.630* 
(1.749)  
0.631* 
(1.745)     
AUDIT_COMMIT 0.504** (2.162)  
0.496** 
(2.357)  
0.494** 
(2.229)     
DUALITY -0.228*** (-2.985)  
-0.233*** 
(-3.063)  
-0.237*** 
(-2.952)     
BLOCK_OWN 1.465*** (3.230)  
1.479*** 
(3.252) 
1.462*** 
(3.319)     
AGE 0.139* (1.671)  
0.143* 
(1.716)  
0.142* 
(1.763)     
ROA 0.310 (1.572)  
0.314 
(1.569)  
0.318 
(1.588)     
SIZE 0.258** (1.996)  
0.264** 
(2.031)  
0.275** 
(2.144)  
1.287*** 
(2.757)  
1.325*** 
(2.762)  
1.384*** 
(2.853)  
LEV 0.216 (1.444)  
0.222 
(1.495)  
0.225 
(1.478)  
0.288* 
(1.768)  
0.290* 
(1.826)  
0.293* 
(1.908)  
LOSS 0.296*** (3.619)  
0.311*** 
(3.560)  
0.319*** 
(3.555)  
0.788 
(1.294)  
0.801 
(1.341)  
0.775 
(1.321)  
INVREC    1.009** (2.038)  
1.023** 
(2.208)  
1.040** 
(2.107)  
AUDITOR    1.017*** (2.829)  
1.026*** 
(2.936)  
1.031*** 
(2.948)  
Adjusted R2 0.528  0.531  0.542  0.461  0.472  0.477  
F-statistic 5.808***  5.839***  5.914***  5.416***  5.536***  5.473***  
No. of obs. 16,225 16,225 16,225 5,006 5,006 5,006 
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TABLE 9 
Results Obtained using an Alternative Measure for the Control-enhancing Mechanism 
Variables Dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent variable: 
AUDITOR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.738*** (3.026)  
1.772*** 
(3.085)  
0.359** 
(2.377)  
0.368** 
(2.415)  
FOWN 0.314*** (4.396) 
0.322*** 
(4.186) 
-0.592*** 
(-3.552) 
-0.586*** 
(-2.934) 
FDIV_BOARD -1.139** (-2.272)   
-2.667** 
(-2.368)   
FDIV_Ratio  -0.965*** (-3.475)   
-1.566** 
(-1.975) 
BOARD_SIZE -1.048** (-2.274) 
-1.068** 
(-2.319)  
0.137** 
(2.518)  
0.139** 
(2.559)  
IND_BOARD 1.322** (2.432)  
1.348** 
(2.480)  
0.390** 
(2.490)  
0.387** 
(2.529)  
AUDIT_COMMIT 1.185 (1.172)  
1.208 
(1.195)  
0.297* 
(1.768)  
0.302* 
(1.796)  
DUALITY -0.982 (-1.226)  
-1.001 
(-1.250)  
-0.068 
(-1.462)  
-0.071 
(-1.485)  
BLOCK_OWN 1.357** (2.086)  
1.383** 
(2.127)  
0.437** 
(2.235)  
0.444** 
(2.271)  
LOSS   0.100** (2.211)  
0.101** 
(2.247)  
ROA   0.125*** (2.942)  
0.127*** 
(2.989)  
SIZE 0.109*** (2.589)  
0.111*** 
(2.639)  
0.084*** 
(3.138)  
0.085*** 
(3.188) 
AGE -0.043* (-1.938)  
-0.044** 
(-1.976)  
0.037*** 
(3.184)  
0.040*** 
(3.236)  
LEV -0.112* (-1.663)  
-0.115* 
(-1.696)  
0.033** 
(2.207) 
0.035** 
(2.243) 
CAPITAL 1.206* (1.902)  
1.209* 
(1.939)    
R&D 1.859*** (3.160)  
1.896*** 
(3.221)    
FIRM_RISK -0.058*** (-2.910)  
-0.061*** 
(-2.967)    
GROWTH 0.164* (1.953)  
0.173** 
(1.991)    
Adjusted R2 0.477 0.471   
F-statistic 6.199*** 6.183***   
Log-likelihood   198.590***  201.777***  
No. of obs. 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225 
This table presents the effects of two alternative proxies for enhanced family control rights, FDIV_BOARD and FDIV_Ratio, on the Tobin’s Q 
(Tobin’s Q) and auditor choice (AUDITOR). FDIV_BOARD is the difference between the percentage of board members dominated by the founding 
families and the percentage of voting rights controlled by them. FDIV_Ratio is the ratio of voting rights divided by cash flow rights held by family 
owners. See Table 2 for detailed definitions of the other variables. Fixed effects of years and industries are included in the regressions but not 
reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
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TABLE 10 
Results after Removing Firms from Industries with Family Firm Dominance 
This table reports the effects of the presence of family firms (FAM), family ownership (FOWN), cash-vote divergence (FDIV), the presences of 
founder CEOs (FF_CEO), descendant CEOs (FD_CEO) and professional CEOs (FH_CEO) on the Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) and auditor choice 
(AUDITOR) after removing sample firms in the Automobile, Rubber, and Cement industries. See Table 2 for detailed variable definitions. Fixed 
effects of years and industries are included in the regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on clustered robust 
standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent variable: 
AUDITOR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.686*** (3.477)  
1.711*** 
(3.383)  
1.795*** 
(3.194)  
0.442** 
(2.170) 
0.440** 
(2.242)  
0.430** 
(2.319)  
FAM 0.090*** (3.119)   
-0.261*** 
(-4.429)   
FOWN   0.197** (2.542)    
-0.730*** 
(-4.971)  
FDIV  -0.245** (-2.275)   
-1.315*** 
(-3.252)  
FF_CEO   0.150*** (3.542)    
-0.379*** 
(-5.088)  
FD_CEO   0.057 (1.094)    
-0.159 
(-1.460)  
FH_CEO   0.107*** (3.281)    
-0.280*** 
(-4.392)  
BOARD_SIZE -1.103** (-2.392)  
-1.109** 
(-2.463)  
-1.117** 
(-2.387)  
0.138** 
(2.229) 
0.141** 
(2.051)  
0.135** 
(2.107)  
IND_BOARD 1.390** (2.559)  
1.400*** 
(2.575)  
1.419*** 
(2.653)  
0.429*** 
(3.052) 
0.427*** 
(2.932)  
0.422*** 
(3.168)  
AUDIT_COMMIT 1.247 (1.220)  
1.250 
(1.195)  
1.256 
(1.282)  
0.320 
(1.470) 
0.316 
(1.444)  
0.317 
(1.505)  
DUALITY -1.044 (-1.290)  
-1.049 
(-1.297)  
-1.054 
(-1.341)  
-0.065 
(-1.538) 
-0.068 
(-1.599)  
-0.071 
(-1.503)  
BLOCK_OWN 1.428** (2.195)  
1.436** 
(2.209)  
1.444** 
(2.283)  
0.589*** 
(2.880) 
0.619*** 
(2.937)  
0.604*** 
(2.995)  
LOSS    0.083** (2.013) 
0.087** 
(2.275)  
0.095** 
(2.260)  
ROA    0.124** (2.511) 
0.130** 
(2.484)  
0.136** 
(2.392)  
SIZE 0.100*** (3.892)  
0.103*** 
(4.442)  
0.097*** 
(3.977)  
0.059*** 
(2.624) 
0.065** 
(2.513)  
0.063*** 
(2.747)  
AGE -0.024*** (-2.654)  
-0.029*** 
(-2.809)  
-0.030*** 
(-2.620)  
0.036** 
(2.263) 
0.040** 
(2.189)  
0.043** 
(2.276)  
LEV -0.106** (-2.067)  
-0.109** 
(-2.045)  
-0.105** 
(-2.005)  
0.061** 
(2.108) 
0.062** 
(2.149)  
0.064** 
(2.173) 
CAPITAL 1.079* (1.934)  
1.089* 
(1.832)  
1.078* 
(1.848)     
R&D 1.788*** (2.848)  
1.813*** 
(3.081)  
1.811*** 
(3.027)     
FIRM_RISK -0.042*** (-3.042)  
-0.045*** 
(-2.954)  
-0.040*** 
(-3.069)     
GROWTH 0.135 (1.544)  
0.136 
(1.538)  
0.139 
(1.498)     
Adjusted R2 0.480  0.485  0.526     
F-statistic 5.924*** 5.843***  6.189***    
Log-likelihood    191.647*** 194.865*** 203.330***  
No. of obs. 15,652 15,652 15,652 15,652 15,652 15,652 
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TABLE 11 
Results Controlling for Endogeneity and Nonlinear Relationship 
Columns (1) - (6) of this table report the 2SLS regression results for the effects of family ownership and cash-vote divergence on the Tobin’s Q 
(Tobin’s Q) and auditor choice (AUDITOR). PFOWN is the predicted FOWN from the first-stage regression. PFDIV is the predicted FDIV from the 
first-stage regression. CSR_DIS and LAG_DIV are employed as instrumental variables in the first-stage analyses. CSR_DIS is a dummy variable 
that has a value of one if the firm discloses CSR activities, and zero otherwise. LAG_DIV is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales in the previous 
year. In addition, Columns (7) and (8) report the results for non-linear effect of family ownership on Tobin’s Q and AUDITOR. SqFOWN is the 
square of family ownership. See Table 2 for detailed definitions of the other variables. Fixed effects of years and industries are included in the 
regressions but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on clustered robust standard errors. Significance levels are denoted based 
on two-tailed tests. 
* < .1 
** < .05 
***<.01 
 Tobin’s Q Model   Auditor Choice Model  Nonlinear 
Variables 2
nd Stage 
Regression 
1nd Stage  
Regression   
2nd Stage 
Regression 
1nd Stage  
Regression   
 Tobin’s Q FOWN FDIV   AUDITOR FOWN FDIV  Tobin’s Q AUDITOR (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept 1.954*** (3.801)    
0.452*** 
(3.226)    
2.328*** 
(3.691) 
0.523*** 
(3.322)   
PFOWN 0.290** (2.027)    
-0.860*** 
(-4.436)       
PFDIV -0.340** (-2.116)    
-1.083*** 
(-4.144)       
FOWN       -0.272 (-1.170) 
0.917 
(1.335)   
SqFOWN       0.724 (0.901) 
-1.818 
(-1.047)   
FDIV       -0.275** (-2.480) 
-1.477** 
(-2.443)  
BOARD_SIZE -1.237*** (-2.741)  
1.484*** 
(2.757)  
0.700*** 
(2.686)  
0.151*** 
(3.152)  
1.526*** 
(2.835)  
0.719*** 
(2.762)  
1.615*** 
(3.528) 
0.174*** 
(3.169)   
IND_BOARD 1.522** (2.320)  
0.959*** 
(2.648)  
-0.506** 
(-2.061)  
0.519*** 
(3.200)  
0.986*** 
(2.723)  
-0.520** 
(-2.119)  
1.663*** 
(3.604) 
0.563*** 
(3.207)   
AUDIT_COMMIT 1.375 (1.591)  
0.861* 
(1.783)  
-0.487 
(-1.345)  
0.340*** 
(2.611)  
0.885* 
(1.833)  
-0.500 
(-1.383)  
1.518 
(1.573) 
0.362 
(1.486)   
DUALITY -1.155 (-1.410)  
1.101** 
(2.096)  
0.585** 
(2.224)  
-0.074* 
(-1.833)  
1.133** 
(2.155)  
0.602** 
(2.287)  
-1.518* 
(-1.816) 
-0.079* 
(-1.731)   
BLOCK_OWN 1.562*** (3.311)  
0.679*** 
(2.628)  
-0.469* 
(-1.875)  
0.543** 
(2.426)  
0.699*** 
(2.702)  
-0.482** 
(-1.998)  
1.385** 
(2.565) 
0.503*** 
(3.090)   
LOSS    0.130** (2.456)  
-1.389*** 
(-3.744)  
0.685* 
(1.775)   
0.139** 
(2.029)   
ROA    0.125*** (3.094)  
1.267** 
(2.051)  
-0.626*** 
(-3.932)   
0.151*** 
(3.650)   
AGE -0.030* (-1.644)  
0.297 
(1.458)  
0.585 
(1.578)  
0.033*** 
(3.732)  
0.305 
(1.499)  
0.602 
(1.623)  
-0.037*** 
(-3.821) 
0.041** 
(2.478)   
SIZE 0.122*** (4.704)  
0.049** 
(2.334)  
0.053* 
(1.895)  
0.095*** 
(5.017)  
0.050** 
(2.400)  
0.055* 
(1.949)  
0.150*** 
(5.889) 
0.081*** 
(4.107)   
LEV -0.117** (-2.426)  
-0.300** 
(-2.524)  
0.639** 
(2.554)  
0.075** 
(2.225)  
-0.308*** 
(-2.595)  
0.657*** 
(2.626)  
-0.141** 
(-2.290) 
0.084*** 
(3.410)   
CAPITAL 1.249 (1.193)  
2.268 
(1.294)  
-1.098 
(-1.456)     
1.594 
(1.604)   
R&D 2.070 (1.242)  
1.984*** 
(2.651)  
-1.118 
(-1.707)     
2.446 
(1.340)   
GROWTH 0.156** (2.256)  
1.133*** 
(3.151)  
-0.835** 
(-2.327)     
0.188*** 
(2.715)   
FIRM_ RISK -0.047*** (-3.435)  
-0.672* 
(-1.908)  
0.754** 
(2.551)     
-0.065*** 
(-3.835)   
Instrument Variables  
CSR_DIS  0.399*** (3.456)  
-0.208** 
(-2.229)   
0.517*** 
(3.081)  
-0.342*** 
(-2.704)    
LAG_DIV  1.431*** (2.996)  
1.867*** 
(3.482)   
1.516*** 
(3.080)  
1.919*** 
(3.581)     
C-statistic 
(p-value) 
4.475** 
(0.034)    
6.781** 
(0.018)      
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
5.098 
(0.287)    
6.673 
(0.409)      
Anderson-Rubin F test 
(p-value) 
46.310*** 
(0.003)    
68.276*** 
(0.005)      
Adjusted R2 0.487      0.499   
Log-likelihood    245.881***    248.820***  
No. of obs. 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225 16,225  
